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Abstract
In some excellent articles in the first issue of The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, scholars have examined in very thoughtful ways the 
relationship of feminism and feminist theory to the field of transitional justice 
and post-conflict. This article examines some of this work and suggests ways 
that we might build on these insights by working more with feminist theories 
of the state, feminist critiques of international human rights law, and with a 
gendered historical consciousness of colonialism and the post-colonial state in 
Africa.
Pamela Scully**
* The author would like to thank Helen Scanlon for her interest in her work, Tom Crick of 
The Carter Center who first introduced her to Liberia, Cerue Garlo and Anu Pillay who 
have shared their work and time most generously, and the Institute for Developing Nations 
at Emory University, which has funded her work on Liberia.
** Pamela Scully is associate professor of women's studies and African studies at Emory 
University. She is on the executive board of The Institute for Developing Nations, an 
action-oriented research institute of Emory University and The Carter Center. 
30
Pamela Scully
Transitional justice work mostly assumes that efforts can make the law work, 
that the state can be forced to do the right thing by women. Feminist critiques of 
international human rights law make one much more suspicious of the state. As 
we shall see, feminist theory in the past twenty years has criticised international 
law’s use of the state as the site of solutions to injustices experienced by women. 
International law has made states accountable for lack of enforcement as much 
as for making appropriate laws to help women. While this is a welcome move, 
one result can be that prescriptions for redress of the violence and inequalities 
women have to bear become a problem only of implementation.
This article argues that in fact, there is a fundamental conceptual misfit in terms 
of trying to secure women’s rights in transitional justice in terms of the state and 
the law only. Particularly in the context of African history from colonial times to 
the present, we have much to worry about in terms of relying on either the state 
or the law. This is particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa where the state 
has so long been illegitimate. The state in Africa since colonial times has been 
rooted in patterns of looting and extraction very far from a nurturing welfare 
state that underpins many of the proposed solutions in transitional justice 
deliberations. While increasingly transitional justice advocates are recognising 
the importance of embedding justice within local structures, a truly historical 
gendered consciousness continues to be absent even in that literature. This 
article brings these criticisms of the state and law to bear on transitional justice 
practice in Africa.
Introduction
Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke (2007:23) advocate that the best 
intervention that feminism can make to transitional justice is by holding all 
participants and framers to the larger dream of ‘securing substantial material 
gains for women in transition’. As they suggest, feminist theorising has reshaped 
many aspects central to periods of transition. It has helped expand the notion 
of conflict to include domestic violence; has helped question the emphasis 
on political structures, and feminist interventions have secured women’s 
involvement in all aspects of the peace process. Bell and O’Rourke envisage a 
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pragmatic role for feminism. They see it as a kind of praxis, which helps those 
involved in transitional justice work for the betterment of women’s lives in the 
complicated transitions to something that looks like peace (Bell and O’Rourke 
2007:23–34).
I agree with much of the article, which highlights the ways in which feminism 
has transformed the field of transitional justice. However, feminism and feminist 
theory have more to offer than solely pragmatic interventions and approaches. 
Since the pioneering work of Carole Pateman and Catherine MacKinnon, 
feminist theorists have been sceptical about the degree to which the state can 
easily deliver justice for women. Indeed as Lori Handrahan (2004) has suggested, 
an examination of the gendered assumptions within the human rights tradition 
itself would be a good place to start. 
The notion of politics and society operating through contracts and agreements is 
now the dominant theory in international law. What does this mean for women, 
when authors charge that the very foundations of this law, both theoretical 
and practical, exclude women? Contract theorists sought to replace unfettered 
monarchical power with a politics of consent. In The Sexual Contract, Pateman 
(1988) argues that the people empowered in this theory of political contract, 
were men bonded together through shared masculinity, conjugal right, and 
opposition to the role of a political patriarch. She argues that men became the 
new political subjects through a kind of patricide. They took power from the 
king and forged a new form of political alliance based on fraternity, but one 
with a more extensive reach; fictive brothers bonded in a public and well as a 
private sphere. 
Pateman further argues that paradoxically, men nonetheless became agents in the 
political sphere precisely by virtue of their role as husbands and fathers. Men’s 
role as heads of patriarchal families composed of women and children under 
their protection gave them the authority to then contract in the public sphere. 
Politics thus depended on an implicit story of the family and of heterosexuality, 




In her Towards a feminist theory of the state of much the same era, MacKinnon 
(1991) turned her attention more explicitly to the law within a framework that 
has been termed radical feminism. Most crucially, MacKinnon argues that the 
law is itself a vehicle for gender discrimination in that law and legal structures 
actually create and maintain male dominance. In subsequent work, she turned 
her attention to domestic violence and pornography. MacKinnon argued that 
the very perspective of the law relating to rape reproduced forms of sexual 
violence in that it adjudicated rape from the male point of view. Using the law 
to address problems of inequality, or sexual violence against women, or to help 
create a new gendered social and political order is thus a fraught endeavour.
In subsequent years, feminist theorists developed the body of feminist legal 
theory, which now embraces many different strands including critical race and 
feminist theory (Lacey 2004; Bonthuys and Albertyn 2007).1 One of the central 
arguments to emerge in the literature in the mid 1990s was scepticism of the 
centrality of the state to international law and the implications for women’s 
interaction with international human rights, and their ability to make it 
work for their interests. Karen Knop suggested that the emphasis on the state 
in international law creates a bias in favour of state sovereignty, which harms 
women. The founders of the United Nations (UN), for example, accepted the 
notion that autonomous states come together to make agreements and are then 
responsible for implementation. The sovereignty of states creates real challenges 
for women, especially when women are poorly represented in governance 
structures. 
We see this problem of women’s exclusion when international law makes the 
state the primary vehicle of reform particularly with regard to agreements that 
seek to secure women’s rights. The United Nations, for example, while securing 
resolutions on women’s rights, such as The Convention to Eliminate All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), also allows states to opt out of key 
1 For a short history of feminist legal theory, see Lacey 2004:13–56. A helpful compendium 
and discussion of feminist jurisprudence with a particular focus on South Africa, is 
Bonthuys and Albertyn 2007. 
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provisions which an individual state feels are violating its own national rights 
(often elided with maintenance of male power) (United Nations 1979).2
In an important and searing critique of existing international human rights 
law, Celina Romany (1994) argued that a feminist genealogy of human rights 
law makes explicit the original sexual contract that the liberal state successfully 
masks. That is, international human rights law also depends upon private/public 
female/male dichotomies, which ensure that the public sphere represents the 
interests of men. Romany (1994:85) suggests that we understand international 
human rights law as a kind of ‘blown up liberal state’ with all its patriarchal 
biases. The notion of the sovereign state, which has to be left alone to pursue 
justice within international legal resolutions and conventions (such as CEDAW), 
she argues, is in fact a recipe to allow men to continue to abuse women. She 
asserts that international law has to hold states accountable for violence to 
women whether in the household or in public, because such violence is not 
random: the risk factor is being female. Romany thus concludes with a call for 
the feminist stance of ‘embodied objectivity’ which recognises explicitly, indeed 
through the frame of intersectionality, how knowledge is produced through 
particular political gender/race/class structures, and seeks to both reveal those 
structures and to combat them.
More recently, Ni Aolain and Rooney (2007) suggest that a frame of 
intersectionality can help redress the gender bias in transitional justice 
mechanisms. Intersectionality puts class, race, and gender together as a way 
of revealing the special discrimination faced by women and also recognises 
the multiple and overlapping sites of subjection (Hill Collins 1990; Crenshaw 
1991). Using an intersectional lens, Ni Aolain and Rooney show that transitional 
justice for women requires a very large and long field of vision, which extends 
beyond the realm of truth commissions, into the complexity of enforcement 
of laws and decisions, awareness of silences about masculinity, and the need to 
avoid stereotypes of women as natural peacekeepers. This approach has much 
to recommend it. I am wary, however, of invoking one theoretical feminist or 
2 CEDAW, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, came 
into force on 3 September 1981. See Article 28, which deals with reservations. For criticism 
of CEDAW, see Sullivan 1995 and Mayer 1995. 
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indeed any other model as a fix for the challenges in securing women’s equality 
and full participation in building post-conflict societies. For instance, Puar 
(2007), while sympathetic to the innovations that intersectional theory allowed 
for, has also sought to move beyond intersectionality which she sees as relying 
upon static and rigid conceptions of class, race and gender rather than seeing 
them in a more unstable and historic tension.3 In this article, I seek to bring the 
messy worlds of history together with the clarity offered by theory. 
As Ni Aolain and Rooney point out, transitional justice mechanisms have tended 
to focus on the law and government to implement justice and to secure gains for 
women. The authors call for a wider field of vision for transitional justice, which 
moves from the merely legal to one that also focuses on implementation of the 
law. This focus is important, as it is precisely the details of how to carry decisions 
forward, or the lack of attention to such details, that can lead to the sidelining of 
women in the final stages of transitional justice processes, even if they have been 
more involved in earlier stages. Certainly we need to make sure that reparations 
given to women are actually implemented, and that the gains secured through 
some Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) processes are realised. We 
also need, I think, to move beyond focusing on the state or government as the 
sole site for redress for women.
Groups are beginning to argue that traditional authorities need to be involved 
in transitional justice processes. For example, the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission argued in a recent paper that a broad conception of justice and one 
that involves so-called traditional authorities is necessary to ensure the success 
of transitional justice (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission – Working 
Group on Lessons Learned 2008). The Liberian Truth Commission, among 
other such bodies, has also advocated the use of indigenous models of conflict 
resolution as a way to encourage reconciliation (Transitional Justice Forum 
2009).4 However, as Sally Engle Merry’s (2006) work shows, human rights 
3 See Puar 2007. While Puar is sympathetic to intersectionality, and particularly to the 
way it has pushed feminist scholarship to think in more complex ways, she uses the term 
assemblages to invoke a more unstable, messier relationship of the usual race/class/gender 
triad.
4 See Huyse 2008.
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advocates tend to see traditional authorities and communities as innately hostile 
to women’s rights. Engle Merry suggests that part of the problem lies in the 
transnational human rights community’s misunderstanding of culture as rooted 
in unchanging cultural norms. Transitional Justice advocates have thus tended 
not to regard traditional forms of conflict resolution as sites to advance women’s 
human rights. They tend to see the state as the place where women’s rights can 
be articulated in law and practice. 
This is where an historical consciousness of African gender histories is germane 
(Oyewumi 2003). Below, I discuss the way that the early imperial era as well as 
that of colonialism caused women’s rights to decline. This all points to a much 
less sanguine picture of how rights might be elaborated, and it certainly disrupts 
one’s confidence that the state and the law are the place to secure women’s rights. 
Colonial Gender Histories
Albert Memmi (1991) among others long ago pointed out that the colonial state 
was an illegitimate state created to serve colonial interests and to sap colonised 
people of their wealth, their self-respect, and their identities. As the now 
somewhat unfashionable school of under-development theory also showed, the 
economies of what was then called the Third World were constructed precisely 
to serve the benefits of Europe: Europe’s rise was premised on Africa’s demise. 
From as early as the move to legitimate trade in the nineteenth century, societies 
found their fortunes linked to European demands for goods, and to Europe’s 
ability to enforce unequal taxation on African goods (Rodney 1972; Wright 
1997). Moreover, as a number of scholars have shown, the colonial eras reworked 
gender relations in African societies largely to the detriment of women. 
It is not the purpose of this article to chart women’s many roles in politics 
and society in the pre-colonial order; other scholars have done that very well 
(Amadiume 1987; Okonjo 1976; Boserup 1970; Ifeka-Moller 1975; Van Allen 
1976). However, I do want to stress, in the context of transitional justice 
work, how important it is to know that women had various forms of status 
as farmers, traders, mothers, elders, members of secret societies, and religious 
figures in the pre-colonial era, and indeed often in the present, although such 
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roles seem sometimes unintelligible to human rights frames (Hodgson 2003; 
Englund 2006). Colonists and agents of the colonial state largely misunderstood 
the complexity of gender relations in the societies they encountered. Yet, those 
colonial interpretations, or misinterpretations, ultimately rendered the position 
of African women ‘legible’ to the rest of the world. The legibility that emerged 
was of the African woman as a ‘beast of burden’ rendered so through her farming 
responsibilities, the presence of polygamy, and of bride price, or lobola, in the 
Southern African context (Oyewumi 2003). I would argue that the remnant of 
this perspective forms the hidden sediment of much of the international work 
on gender-based violence in Africa.
The early colonial era reshaped women’s role in agriculture, their political 
power, and even their access to the colonial state to their disadvantage. Men 
took over the growing and marketing of crops which were formerly understood 
as women’s crops, but then became lucrative on the market (Martin 1984). In 
the early twentieth century, in regions where the slave trade had dominated 
the export economy for so long, but was then outlawed, increasing numbers 
of women were put to work in agricultural labour as slaves, although often also 
married to their owners.
As a number of authors have documented, women fought to free themselves 
and to return to their natal families, but found it hard going to make the case 
to colonial courts, which tended to send them back to their owners (Klein and 
Roberts 2005). To some extent then one could see the colonial state, be it in 
French West Africa, in present day Mali and Niger, or in Eastern and Southern 
Africa, as one which upheld certain forms of patriarchal control over women. 
The colonial state and African male elders cooperated to control the movement 
and independence of women, with the state passing laws to hamper women’s 
movements to towns, to mines, and helping to create customary laws which 
bolstered the power of male elders (Chanock 1998; White 1990; Byfield 2002; 
Lovett 1989).5
5 The formative work on this is Chanock 1998. On Kenya see White 1990. For work which 
suggests more agency for women, see Byfield 2002. See also Lovett 1989.
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In Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon (1967) cast a jaundiced eye at the 
coming of independence to Africa. He predicted that the new post-colonial 
state would be independent in name only, ruled by individuals who had 
been tutored in European schools to cleave to the ideologies of Europe and 
to reject the solutions offered by indigenous African models of social and 
political organisation. Indeed as Basil Davidson (1992) lamented, the notion 
that the Asante Kingdom might be a legitimate model for governing Ghana on 
independence had become, by the 1950s, a virtually unthinkable idea. The state 
that colonialism bequeathed to independent Africa, was thus one which was 
premised upon pillage and, in the case of the settler colonies of South Africa, 
Kenya, and Rhodesia, for example, was organised precisely to make Africans 
serve the economic and psychic needs of the white minority. The post-colonial 
state was also, for all the reasons outlined above, one that continued to uphold 
many of the discriminatory practices against women that colonialism had 
helped institute, despite the promises of the independence movements.
Indeed as Mojubaolu Olufunke Okome (2003:82) argues, ‘In both its colonial 
and post-colonial forms, the African State has discriminated consistently 
against women’. In the late 1980s, Parpart and Staudt (1989:5) pointed out 
that ‘everywhere the political elite is male’ and stated that women generally 
had marginal access to the state. The 1990s witnessed the entrance of women 
in Africa into formal politics in dramatic ways. Transitions ranging from the 
ending of apartheid in South Africa in 1990, to the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994, led to a realignment of formal politics. Countries emerging from conflict 
witnessed some of the most dramatic entrances of women to politics. As Aili 
Tripp has noted ‘[T]hirteen of fourteen post-conflict countries have banned 
discrimination based on sex’ (Tripp et al. 2009:6). Women claimed some one-
third of parliamentary seats in a host of countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, 
and Tanzania. It is unclear, however, whether the presence of women alone is 
sufficient to transform the gender ideologies of a state to one in which men 
and women can be equal citizens. In the 2000s, women’s activism continued to 
reshape politics. During the stalled Liberian peace process, women organised 
across religious and ethnic lines in an attempt to force men to make peace. 
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Moreover, Liberians subsequently elected Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005 as the 
first democratically elected woman as head of state in Africa. 
President Sirleaf has made securing women’s rights one of the pillars of her 
administration, passing laws against rape and domestic violence, and a law 
allowing women to inherit property. Yet, the ability of the state, especially a post-
conflict one, which is after all where transitional justice works, to implement 
reforms remains very challenging. Policy documents rely on the state as the 
imagined goal for addressing ills, but point to the inadequacy of state and 
legal structures to implement laws and to transform society (Vann 2002).6 In 
addition, given the history of the state in the last century in Africa, one wonders 
at the wisdom of using the state as the major vehicle for transformation. Recent 
work in African Studies suggests that people see the state (both the colonial 
state, as well as many of its contemporary forms) as malevolent and capricious, 
with a vampire-like quality of extraction (Crais 2002; Geschiere 1997). Women’s 
collective action and extra-state political organising has proved to be a much 
more effective setting for addressing women’s rights than the state. I propose 
that advocates of transitional justice look to new sites for the transformation of 
societies; women after all are already doing things for themselves.
Conclusion: Models that take women’s rights seriously, but 
which work outside of the state
Initiatives for peace and post-conflict rebuilding are being forged in partnerships 
between different religious traditions, and in projects rooted both in ongoing work 
by women, and in new partnerships between non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and local women’s groups (Miller 1993:19). In Liberia, UNIFEM’s 
(United Nations Development Fund for Women) former gender liaison to 
the Liberian TRC, Anu Pillay, and Cerue Garlo of Liberia’s WONGOSOL (the 
Women’s NGO Secretariat of Liberia), have collaborated in an ambitious and 
meaningful project to create fora in which women can discuss their agendas 
6 The general report on gender-based violence world-wide, Vann 2002, is a very good 
example of this. See particularly the case study reports, which document the fragility of the 
state.
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for society and for the future. In Monrovia, at Mother Patern College of Health 
Sciences, faculty emphasise empowering women through education, coming up 
with their own diagnoses and definitions of what needs to be done, and generally 
working to move beyond prescriptions as to how to accomplish change.
The women of West Point settlement in Monrovia have formed the West Point 
Women’s Action Group to try to combat rape and other violence that plague 
the settlement. The organs of the state are absent in West Point; no police 
visit, rapists go unpunished, no formal legal structures protect West Point 
(International Rescue Committee 2008; Dunning 2008).7 If women are to rely 
on the state for aid, it will be a very long time coming. Moreover, Liberia is 
not alone. Even with great commitment by a president who does take women’s 
rights seriously, the challenges inherited by post-conflict nations overwhelm 
the law and the state. Fixing these mechanisms will take time. In the meantime, 
advocates of transitional justice need to help women and men where they are 
currently located: without access to law, judiciary or medical care – all the 
potential wonders of the state. This is a burgeoning field, and one in which 
different transitional justice groups are beginning to work.
The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and The Carter Center, 
among other groups, are beginning to work beyond formal legal structures, even 
as they also seek to strengthen the law. The Carter Center organises their rule-
of-law project in Liberia around support for legal reforms initiated by President 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The Carter Center works with lawyers, the government, 
and the judiciary to try to make the law work better. However, the Carter Center 
also works with local youth groups to try to raise consciousness in rural areas 
around issues of legal rights and gender violence. The Bong Youth Association, 
for example, holds drama performances in Bong County as a way of engaging 
elders and youth in discussions around violence, gender, and community. 
The realm of education, both in formal schooling and, as importantly, in popular 
culture is, I think, a very fruitful realm of work, and one to which those of us 
writing on transitional justice need to begin paying more attention.




Perhaps because the more recent transitional justice approaches began with 
truth commissions, and are part of a wider field of international law, the state 
has remained the key field for bringing societies through conflict and beyond. 
The perspective that the state is the main site of transformation is so dominant, 
and ingrained in political theory and international law, that it seems perhaps 
peculiar to even venture the opinion that the state might not be the best agent 
for post-conflict transformation. However, this reliance on the state might in 
fact be a bad thing for women in much of Sub-Saharan Africa at the present 
time. African history of the last century or so, points to ways in which Africans 
saw the colonial and post-colonial state as rapacious and illegitimate. What good 
work can transitional justice do when it works within a framework of law and 
the state that intrinsically does not have much legitimacy? I think we need to 
rethink how we do much post-conflict work, particularly around the issues of 
combating sexual violence and trying to bolster women’s rights.
As we come to recognise the long-term processes that comprise traditional 
justice, we need thus to be cognisant of history. We need to know the history of 
the particular country, of the ravages of colonialism and the disappointments 
and violence of the post-colonial period even prior to the conflict that preceded 
the recent moves to peace. Such recognition and understanding, if always partial, 
will help us build peace and security in the places which work, the religious 
institutions, the village councils, women’s groups, in the actual structures of the 
everyday.
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